Pervasive computing applications use the knowledge of the environment to provide better services and functionality to the end user. Access control for such applications needs to use contextual information. Towards this end, we proposed an access control model based on RBAC that uses the environmental contexts time and location to determine whether a user can get access to some resource. The model also supports delegation which is important for dynamic applications where a user is unavailable and permissions may have to be transferred temporarily to another user/role in order to complete a specific task. Such a model typically has numerous features to support the requirements of various applications. The features may interact in subtle ways to produce conflicts. Here, we propose an automated approach using Alloy for detecting such conflicts. Alloy is supported by a software infrastructure that allows automated analysis of models and has been used to verify industrial applications. The results obtained from the analysis will enable the users of the model to make informed decisions.
Introduction
With the increase in the growth of wireless networks and sensor and mobile devices, we are moving towards an era of pervasive computing. The growth of this technology will spawn applications such as, the Aware Home [10] and CMU's Aura [12] , that will make life easier for people. However, before such applications can be widely deployed, it is important to ensure that no authorized users can access the resources of the application and cause security and privacy breaches. Traditional access control models, such as, Bell-LaPadula (BLP) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), do not work well for pervasive computing applications because the applications are dynamic in nature and do not take into account environmental factors while making access decisions. Consequently, new access control models are needed for such applications.
Access control for pervasive applications need to take into account environmental factors, such as location and time, before making access decisions. For instance, we may want access to a computer be enabled when a user enters Based Access Control (LBAC) model where the access is contingent upon the location information of the user and his credentials. Yu et al. [33] proposed LTAM a location-temporal authorization model which focuses on controlling user access to the different locations. Pu et al. [19] present the context access control model, called CACM, which integrates the context information to the UCON ABC usage control model. Context Sensitive Access Control (CSAC) [13] proposed by Hulsebosch et al. focus on using context information such as time, location, velocity to control the accessibility of services while preserving the privacy of user information. Hengartner et al. [12] discuss how location information pertaining to a user can be securely accessed.
Researchers have also worked on extending RBAC to support ubiquitous computing applications. Sampemane et al.
[25] present a new access control model for active spaces which denote the computing environment integrating physical spaces and embedded computing software and hardware entities. Environmental aspects are adopted into the access control model for active spaces, and the space roles are introduced into the implementation of the access control model based on RBAC. Covington et al. [10] introduce environment roles in a generalized RBAC model (GRBAC) to help control access to private information and resources in ubiquitous computing applications. The environments roles differ from the subject roles in RBAC but do have similar properties including role activation, role hierarchy and separation of duty. Environmental roles are also associated with permissions, and the environmental roles are activated when the environmental conditions change. In a subsequent work [9] , Covington et al. describe the Context-Aware Security Architecture (CASA) which is an implementation of the GRBAC model. Ya-Jun et al. [32] and Chakraborty et al. [6] proposed trust based access control models, based on extending RBAC, for applications where users are not known in advance.
Other extensions to RBAC include the Temporal Role-Based Access Control Model (TRBAC) proposed by Bertino et al. [4] which adds the time dimension to the RBAC model. Joshi et al. [17] extend this work by proposing the Generalized Temporal Role Based Access Control Model (GTRBAC) where they introduce the concept of time-based role hierarchy and time-based separation of duty. In a subsequent work [15] , Joshi and Bertino extend GTRBAC to support delegation operation in presence of the different types of temporal role-hierarchy. Researchers have also extended RBAC to incorporate spatial information [5, 21] . Incorporating both time and location in RBAC is addressed by several works [7, 23, 26] . Chandran's work combines the main features of GTRBAC and GEO-RBAC. Here again, role is enabled by time constraints. The user can activate the role if the role is enabled and the user satisfies the location constraints associated with role activation. Samuel et al. [26] propose GST-RBAC which incorporates topological spatial constraints to the existing GTRBAC model. In [23] , we propose Spatio-Temporal RBAC which is an extension of RBAC model supporting the temporal and spatial constraints. Although the goal of this work is similar to those proposed by Chandran et al. [7] and Samuel et al. [26] , the model can express some real-world constraints that are not possible in the other ones. In a subsequent work [24] , we extended the model to support the delegation operation. Chen and Crampton use a graph based representation for defining a precise semantics for a spatio-temporal RBAC model [8] .
Many works appear that analyze RBAC specifications. The formal analysis of the different types of time-based hybrid hierarchy [15, 17] is proposed by Joshi et al. in [16] . Some researchers have used formal specification languages, such as Z and UML, to analyze RBAC specifications [22, 21, 34] ; however, these languages do not support automated analysis. Towards this end, researchers have advocated the use of Alloy for modeling RBAC specifications. In [35] , Zao et al. model basic features of RBAC, role hierarchy, and static separation of duties. Schaad et al. model user- role assignment, role-permission assignment, role hierarchy, and static separation of duties features of RBAC extension using Alloy in [28] . The authors do not model role activation hierarchy, dynamic separation of duties or the delegation operation. The authors briefly describe how to analyze conflicts in the context of the model. Samuel et al. [26] also illustrate how GST-RBAC can be specified in Alloy. They describe how the various GST-RBAC functionalities, that is, user-role assignment, role-permission assignment, and user-role activation, can be specified by Alloy. However, this work does not focus on how to identify interactions between features that result in conflicts. Our recent work [31] fills this gap. We propose the methodology to verify the specification of spatio-temporal RBAC model by using Alloy Analyzer tool. The work however, does not support the delegation operation. The current work adapts this approach to verify a more complex model -spatio-temporal RBAC with delegation.
Relationship of Core-RBAC Entities with Time and Location
We begin by discussing how time and location are related in our model, and then discuss how the different entities of core RBAC, namely, Users, Roles, Sessions, Permissions, Objects and Operations, are associated with location and time.
Representing Location and Time
Locations that correspond to the physical world are referred to as the physical locations. Physical location PLoc i is a non-empty set of points
where a point p k is represented by three co-ordinates. Physical locations are grouped into symbolic representations that are used by applications and referred to as logical locations. Examples of logical locations are Fort Collins, Colorado etc. Logical location is an abstract notion for one or more physical locations.
We assume the existence of two translation functions, m and m , that convert from logical locations to physical locations and vice-versa. In this work, we focus on the containment relation between locations that formalizes the idea whether one location is contained within another. A physical location ploc j is said to be contained in another physical location ploc k , denoted as, ploc j ploc k , if the following condition holds: 
Users
We assume that each valid user, interested in doing some location-sensitive operation, carries a locating device which is able to track his location. The location of a user changes with time. The relation UserLocation u ¥ t gives the location of the user at any given time instant t. Since a user can be associated with only one location at any given point of time,
we have the following constraint:
We define a similar function UserLocations u
that gives the location of the user during the time interval d. Note that, a single location can be associated with multiple users at any given point of time.
Objects
Objects can be physical or logical. Example of a physical object is a computer. Files are examples of logical objects.
Physical objects have devices that transmit their location information with the timestamp. Logical objects are stored in physical objects. The location and timestamp of a logical object corresponds to the location and time of the physical object containing the logical object. We assume that each object is associated with one location at any given instant of time. Each location can be associated with many objects. The function ObjLocation(o,t) takes as input an object o and a time instance t and returns the location associated with the object at time t. Similarly, the function ObjLocations (o,d) takes as input an object o and time interval d and returns the location associated with the object.
Roles
We have three types of relations with roles. These are user-role assignment, user-role activation, and permission-role assignment. We begin by focusing on user-role assignment. Often times, the assignment of user to roles is location and time dependent. For instance, a person can be assigned the role of U.S. citizen only in certain designated locations and at certain times only. To get the role of conference attendee, a person must register at the conference location during specific time intervals. Thus, for a user to be assigned a role, he must be in designated locations during specific time intervals. In our model, a user must satisfy spatial and temporal constraints before roles can be assigned. We capture this with the concept of role allocation. A role is said to be allocated when it satisfies the temporal and spatial constraints needed for role assignment. A role can be assigned once it has been allocated. 
always.
Some roles can be activated only if the user is in some specific locations. For instance, the role of audience of a theater can be activated only if the user is in the theater when the show is on. The role of conference attendee can be activated only if the user is in the conference site while the conference is in session. In short, the user must satisfy temporal and location constraints before a role can be activated. We borrow the concept of role-enabling [4, 17] to describe this. A role is said to be enabled if it satisfies the temporal and location constraints needed to activate it. A role can be activated only if it has been enabled. RoleEnableLoc r
gives the location where role r can be activated and
RoleEnableDur r
gives the time interval when the role can be activated.
The predicate UserRoleAssign u
states that the user u is assigned to role r during the time interval d and location l. For this predicate to hold, the location of the user when the role was assigned must be in one of the locations where the role allocation can take place. Moreover, the time of role assignment must be in the interval when role allo-cation can take place.
UserRoleAssign u
is true if the user u activated role r for the interval d at location l. This predicate implies that the location of the user during the role activation must be a subset of the allowable locations for the activated role and all times instances when the role remains activated must belong to the duration when the role can be activated and the role can be activated only if it is assigned.
UserRoleActivate u
The additional constraints imposed upon the model necessitates changing the preconditions of the functions AssignRole and ActivateRole. The permission role assignment is discussed later.
Sessions
In 
SessionRole u
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Permissions
The goal of our model is to provide more security than their traditional counterparts. This happens because the time and location of a user and an object are taken into account before making the access decisions. Our model also allows us to model real-world requirements where access decision is contingent upon the time and location associated with the user and the object. For example, a teller may access the bank confidential file if and only if he is in the bank and the file location is the bank secure room and the access is granted only during the working hours. Our model should be capable of expressing such requirements.
Permissions are associated with roles, objects, and operations. We associate three additional entities with permission to deal with spatial and temporal constraints: user location, object location, and time. We define three functions to retrieve the values of these entities. We define another predicate which we term PermRoleAcquire (p,r,d,l) . This predicate is true if role r has permission p for duration d at location l. Note that, for this predicate to be true, the time interval d must be contained in the dura-tion where the permission can be invoked and the role can be enabled. Similarly, the location l must be contained in the places where the permission can be invoked and role can be enabled.
PermRoleAcquire p
means that user u can acquire the permission p on object o for duration d at location l. This is possible only when the permission p is assigned some role r which can be activated during d and at location l, the user location and object location match those specified in the permission, the duration d matches that specified in the permission.
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Impact of Time and Location on Role-Hierarchy
This organization structure is reflected in RBAC in the form of a role hierarchy [27] which is a transitive, anti-symmetric relation among roles. Senior roles can inherit the permissions of junior roles, or a senior role can activate a junior role, or do both depending on the nature of the hierarchy. Joshi et al. [17] identify two basic types of hierarchy. The first is the permission inheritance hierarchy where a senior role x inherits the permission of a junior role y. The second is the role activation hierarchy where a user assigned to a senior role can activate a junior role. Each of these hierarchies may be constrained by location and temporal constraints. Consequently, we have a number of different hierarchical relationships in our model that are described below.
[Unrestricted Permission Inheritance Hierarchy] A senior role inherits the junior roles permissions but not the spatial and temporal constraints associated with it. For example, account auditor role inherits the permissions from the accountant role but he can use the permissions at any time and at any place. If x and y be roles such that x 3 y, that is, senior role x has an unrestricted permission-inheritance relation over junior role y, then x inherits y's permissions but not the locations and time associated with it. y, that is, senior role x has a role-activation relation over junior role y, then a user assigned to role x can activate role y at any time and at any place. t y, that is, senior role x has a role-activation relation over junior role y, then a user assigned to role x can activate role y only at the time when role y can be enabled.
[Location Restricted Permission Inheritance Hierarchy] A senior role inherits the junior roles permissions but these permissions are restricted to the locations imposed on the junior roles. For example, a top secret scientist inherits the permission of top secret citizen only when he is in top secret locations. If x and y be roles such that x 3 l y, that is, senior role x has a location restricted permission-inheritance relation over junior role y, then x inherits y's permissions together with the location constraints associated with the permission. l y, that is, senior role x has a role-activation relation over junior role y, then a user assigned to role x can activate role y only at the places when role y can be enabled.
[Time Location Restricted Permission Inheritance Hierarchy] A senior role inherits the junior roles permissions
together with the spatial and temporal constraints imposed upon those of the junior role. For example, daytime doctor role inherits permission of daytime nurse role only when he is in the hospital during the daytime. If x and y be roles such that x 3 tl y, that is, senior role x has a time-location restricted permission-inheritance relation over junior role y, then x inherits y's permissions together with the temporal and location constraints associated with the permission.
[Time Location Restricted Activation Hierarchy]:
A user who can activate a senior role can also activate a junior role but must obey the temporal and spatial constraints imposed on the activation of the junior role. For example, user who has a role of mobile user can activate the weekend mobile user role only if he/she is in the US during the weekend. If x and y be roles such that x 4 tl y, that is, senior role x has a role-activation relation over junior role y, then a user assigned to role x can activate role y only at the places and during the time when role y can be enabled.
Impact of Time and Location on Static Separation Of Duties
Separation of duties (SoD) enables the protection of the fraud that might be caused by the user [29] . SoD can be either static or dynamic. Static Separation of Duty (SSoD) comes in two varieties. First one is with respect to user role assignment. The second one is with respect to permission role assignment. In the first case, the SoD is specified as a relation between roles. The idea is that the same user cannot be assigned to the same role. Due to the presence of temporal and spatial constraints, we can have different flavors of separation of duties -some that are constrained by temporal and spatial constraints and others that are not. In the following we describe the different separation of duty constraints.
[Weak Form of SSoD -User Role Assignment]
The same user cannot be assigned to two conflicting roles during the same time and at the same location. For example, a user should not be assigned the audience role and mobile phone user role at the same time and location. Let x and y be two roles such that x 
ROLES
, that is, x and y are two distinct roles that are related by the SSOD w relation. A user u assigned to role x during time d and location l cannot be assigned to role y at the same time and location if x and y are related by SSOD w .
The same user cannot be assigned to two conflicting roles at the same location at any time. The consultant for oil company A will never be assigned the role of consultant for oil company B in the same country. Let x and y be two roles such that x 6 y and
, that is, x and y are two distinct roles that are related by the SSOD t relation. A user u assigned to role x during time d and location l cannot be assigned to role y at any time d in the same location if x and y are related by SSOD t . 
, that is, x and y are two distinct roles that are related by the SSOD l relation. A user u assigned to role x during time d and location l cannot be assigned to role y at the same time at any location l if x and y are related by SSOD l . 
, that is, x and y are two distinct roles that are related by the SSOD s relation. A user u assigned to role x during time d and location l cannot be assigned to role y at any time d or at any location l if x and y are related by SSOD s .
We next consider the second form of static separation of duty that deals with permission role assignment. The idea is that the same role should not acquire conflicting permissions. The same manager should not make a request for funding as well as approve it.
[Weak Form of SSoD -Permission Role Assignment] The same role cannot be assigned two conflicting permissions during the same time and at the same location. For example, a passenger role should not be assigned the permission to go aboard the plane and use the cell phone at the same place and time. Let p and q be two permissions such that p 
Impact of Time and Location on Dynamic Separation of Duties
Static separation of duty ensures that a user does not get assigned conflicting roles or a role is not assigned conflicting permissions. Dynamic separation of duty addresses the problem that a user is not able to activate conflicting roles during the same session. If roles x and y are related through weak DSoD and if user u has activated role x in some session s for duration d and location l, then u cannot activate role y during the same time d and in the same location l in session s. at the same location in the same session. 
False

[Strong Form of DSoD]
A user can never activate the roles related through strong DSoD. For example, a user cannot be both a code developer and a code tester in the same session. Let x and y be two roles such that x 6 y and
If roles x and y are related through strong DSoD and if user u has activated role x in some session s, then u can never activate role y in the same session.
False
Impact of Time and Location on Delegation
Many situations require the temporary transfer of access rights to accomplish a given task. For example, in a pervasive computing application, a doctor may give certain privilege to a trained nurse, when he is taking a short break. In such situations, the doctor can give a subset of his permission to the nurse for a given period of time. There are a number of different types of delegation. The entity that transfers his privileges temporarily to another entity is often referred to as the delegator. The entity who receives the privilege is known as the delegatee. The delegator (delegatee) can be either an user or a role. Thus, we may have four types of delegations: user to user (U2U), user to role (U2R), role to role (R2R), and role to user (R2U). System administrators are responsible for overseeing delegation when the delegator is a role. Individual users administer delegation when the delegator is an user. When a user is the delegator, he can delegate a subset of permissions that he possesses by virtue of being assigned to different roles. When a role is the delegator, he can delegate either a set of permissions or he can delegate the entire role. We can therefore classify delegation on the basis of role delegation or permission delegation. We identify the following types of delegation.
[U2U Unrestricted Permission Delegation] In this type of delegation, the delegatee can invoke the delegator's permissions at any time and at any place where the delegator could invoke those permissions. The illness of the company president caused him to delegate his email reading privilege to his secretary.
be the predicate that allows user u to delegate the permissions in the set Perm to user v without any temporal or spatial constraints. This will allow v to invoke the permissions at any time or at any place. 
[U2U Time Location Restricted Permission Delegation]
In this case, the delegator imposes a limit on the time and the location where the delegatee can invoke the permission. A nurse can delegate his permission to oversee a patient while he is resting in his room to a relative. Let DelegateU2U P tl
be the predicate that allows user u to delegate the permissions in the set Perm to user v in the location l 
In this case, the delegator delegates a role to the delegatee but the role can be activated only for a more limited duration than the original role. A user can delegate his role as a teacher to a responsible student while he is in a conference. Let
be the predicate that allows user u to delegate his role r to user v for the duration d .
In this case, the delegator delegates a role to the delegatee but the role can be activated in more limited locations than the original role. A student can delegate his lab supervision role to another student in a designated portion of the lab only.
be the predicate that allows user u to delegate his role r to user v in the location l .
[U2U Time Location Restricted Role Delegation]
The delegator delegates the role, but the delegatee can activate the role for a limited duration in limited places. A student can delegate his lab supervision role to another student only in the lab when he leaves the lab for emergency reasons. Let DelegateU2U R tl
be the predicate that allows user u to delegate his role r to user v in location l and time d . constraints. This will allow users in the role r 2 to invoke the permissions at any time or at any place.
The delegator role can place temporal restrictions on when the users of the delegatee role can invoke the permissions. No special restrictions are placed with respect to location i.e. the delegatee role's users can invoke the permissions at any place that the delegator role's users could do so. CS599
teacher role can grant the permission to access course materials to CS599 student role for the specific semester. Let
be the predicate that allows role r 1 to delegate the permissions in the set Perm to role
The delegator role places spatial constraints on where the users of the delegatee role can invoke the permissions. No special temporal constraints are placed, that is, the delegatee role's users can invoke the permissions at any time that the delegator role's users could do so. The librarian role may grant the permission to checkout the book to the student role only at the self-checkout station. Let DelegateR2R P l
be the predicate that allows role r 1 to delegate the permissions in the set Perm to role r 2 in the location l .
The delegator role imposes a limit on the time and the location where the delegatee role's users could invoke the permissions. The daytime doctor role may delegate the permission to get his location information to the nurse role only when he is in the hospital during the daytime. Let
be the predicate that allows role r 1 to delegate the permissions in the set Perm to role r 2 in the location l for the duration d . The various invariants in the access control model are represented as facts in Alloy. For instance, the fact URActivate states that for user u to activate role r during the time interval d and location l, this user has to be assigned to role r in location l during time d. Moreover, the location of the user must be a subset of the locations where the role is enabled, and the time must be in the time interval when role r can be enabled. This is specified in Alloy as shown below. Other invariants are modeled in a similar manner. (dte->o->p->tl in puacq.member)} Finally, to check for conflicts, we create an assertion that specifies the properties we want to verify and then let the ALLOY analyzer validate the assertion using the check command. If our assertion does not hold in the specified scope, ALLOY analyzer will generate a counterexample. For example, to check the interaction of the Weak form of SSOD Permission Role Assignment and the R2R Unrestricted Permission Delegation, we make the assertion shown below.
DelegateR2R R
The assertion does not hold as illustrated by the counterexample shown in Figure 1 . that supports delegation can be specified and automatically analyzed using Alloy. Our analysis reveals the potential conflicts that may occur in our model.
A lot of work remains to be done. Our analysis reveals undesirable interactions only for those case that we tested; the analysis is therefore not complete. We plan to investigate new techniques that will reveal all types of undesirable interactions without requiring input from the analysts. We also plan to investigate how to verify dynamic access control models where the entities and relationships are changed on the fly and the analysis must be done in real-time. Since pervasive computing applications are typically modeled as dynamic workflows, we need to extend our access control model to support them. Moreover, it is unlikely that a single access control model can fulfill all the needs for pervasive computing applications. Towards this end, we plan to investigate how our model can be composed with other models, and the result verified to give assurance that the resulting behavior is acceptable.
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